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ABSTRACTS OF RECENT CASES
EvnInacE-JuDicIAL NoTICE OF MuNicPAL OnrINANcE.-P was

arrested for driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of
alcohol in violation of a municipal ordinance. P was convicted in
the justice court and appealed to the circuit court which took judicial notice of the municipal ordinance and entered judgment upon
a finding of guilt. On writ of error to the supreme court, held, that
the circuit court may not take judicial notice of an ordinance of a
municipal corporation, but such ordinance, like other material facts,
must be pleaded and proved. However, municipal and justice courts
must take judicial notice of all such ordinances within their own
territorial jurisdiction. Sisk v. Town of Shenandoah, 105 S.E.2d 169
(Va. 1958).
The court in the principal case adhered to the general rule in
holding that courts of record will not take judicial notice of ordinances of municipal corporations and counties, and that such ordinances like other material facts must be pleaded and proved. 20 AM.

Jxm. Evidence § 37 (1989).
In West Virginia it has been held that a city court may take
judicial notice of municipal ordinances. Town of Moundsville v.
Velton, 35 W. Va. 217, 13 S.E. 373 (1891); City of Wheeling v.
Black, 25 W. Va. 266 (1884).
In Elswick v. CharlestonTransit Co., 128 W. Va. 241, 45 S.E.2d
499 (1945), the court stated in point one of the syllabus, "except
that the courts of a municipal corporation will take judicial notice
of the ordinances of such corporation, courts do not judicially take
notice of the ordinances of a municipal corporation .... " See also,
Barniak v. Grossman, 141 W. Va. 760, 93 S.E.2d 49 (1956). However, the court may be directed to take judicial notice by statute and
that will be controlling. Cf. City of Huntington v. Salyer, 135 W.
Va. 397, 63 S.E.2d 575 (1951); Rich v. Rosenshine, 131 W. Va. 30,
45 S.E.2d 499 (1947).

EvmxqcE-SF-_aCH AND Szuna-A.nmssBurr WHEN OBTAINED
AmwsT WITOUT A WABRANr.-D, was convicted in a

INCIDENT TO

district court of housebreaking, larceny and unlawful possession of
dangerous drugs. Certain informants described and identified D to
police and told where D could be found selling certain stolen drugs
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Upon arriving at this place an officer found D engaging persons in
whispered conversation. D was seen by the officer carrying a small
brown paper bag which D set down while he put on his coat. He
was arrested before he picked the bag up again. D claimed illegal
search and seizure and moved to suppress the introduction of the
evidence thus obtained. From an adverse ruling, D appealed. Held,
that as a result of the advance "tip" along with the officer's observations of D's appearance and conduct there was probable cause for
making the arrest and property taken from D incidental to the arrest
was admissible. Christensen v. United States, 259 F.2d 192 (D.C.
Cir. 1958).
The holding of the principal case has been substantiated in an
analogous case recently decided by the United States Supreme
Court. Draper v. United States, 79 Sup. Ct. 329 (1959). In the
Draper case the court held that where a federal officer has probable
cause to believe that the accused has committed or is committing a
violation of narcotics laws then the officer may lawfully arrest the
accused without a warrant. The court further held that the officer
may, without constitutional objections, search the accused as an incident to a lawful arrest, and evidence obtained during the search is
admissible.
In West Virginia an officer may, without a warrant, lawfully arrest any person whom the officer, on reasonable grounds, believes
has committed a felony. Brown v. Spangler,120 W. Va. 72, 197 S.E.
360 (1988). Evidence obtained as an incident to a lawful arrest,
though without a search warrant, is admissible. State v. Wills, 91
W. Va. 659, 114 S.E. 261, 24 A.L.R. 1898 (1922).
In the Will case, supra,the court stated in point four of the syllabus, "It is unlawful, under section 6 of article 8 of the Constitution
of this State, forbidding unreasonable searches and seizures for an
officer, without a warrant authorizing it, to search a person, except
that one legally arrested may be searched for property connected
with the offense that may be used as evidence against him...."
Therefore, on -thebasis of these decisions, a result similar to that
reached in the principal case would also be reached in West Virginia.

MuNirA

CORPORATiONS-EGuLAON OF STmRrs.-P placed

a large sign advertising his used car business on top of an automobile
and parked the automobile during the daytime in parking meter
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spaces in a downtown business section. P paid the meter charge, left
the automobile unattended and did not negotiate or consummate
any sales from the meter spaces. The city contended that this act
was violative of a city ordinance prohibiting the use or occupancy of
meter spaces for carrying on business. P sought a writ of prohibition contending that the ordinance was unconstitutional as an overextension. of the police power. Held, that such use of meter space
violated the ordinance notwithstanding the fact that P neither negotiated nor consummated any sales from the meter space. The court
further found the statute to be constitutional in that it rested largely
upon the power of the city to regulate and control its streets and not
exclusively upon the police power of the city. Cherry v. Menton,
314 S.W.2d 566 (Ky. 1958).
The court in the principal case stated that the purpose of the
ordinance was to prohibit the usurpation of meter spaces for use
designated primarily to accomplish the furtherance of a business objective. The court distinguished the situation in which the use of the
meter had only an incidental relation to business such as parking for
the purpDse of making a business visit The test applied by the
court, as to whether the ordinance has been violated or not, is
whether the occupancy, itself, accomplishes the business objective
rather than being merely an incident of travel for a business purpose.
The power of a city to prohibit the use of city streets as a place
for the promotion of private business is firmly established. Hodge
Drive-It-Yourself Co. v. City of Cincinnati,284 U.S. 385 (1932).
In Kaszer v. City of Morgantown, 108 W. Va. 712, 152 S.E. 747
(1930), the supreme court held that, "A municipality, under its police power, may, in the interest of public safety, enforce reasonable
regulations relating to the private use of its streets and sidewalks."
See also, Hendersonv. City of Bluefield, 98 W. Va. 640, 127 S.E. 592,
42 A.L.R. 279 (1925); Beck v. Cox, 77 W. Va. 442, 87 S.E. 492
(1915). For a more detailed discussion, see 10 McQumIxq, MuNiciPAL ComoRIAoNs § 80.39 et seq. (3d ed. 1950).

Ilocu E-TmLA JUDGE'S DIsCm noN-MANmDuS AND PRomBrrIoN.-P, was being tried for a crime in a United States district
court. P filed an affidavit with the court alleging bias and prejudice
on the part of the presiding judge and asked that the judge disqualify himself. The judge determined that the allegations of the
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affidavit of bias and prejudice were insufficient to disqualify him. P
thereupon petitioned the court of appeals for a writ of mandamus or
prohibition to prevent the judge from further proceeding with the
case. Held,that it was within the province of the district court judge
to determine the sufficiency of the allegations in the affidavit, and
that in so doing he must accept the allegations of the affidavit as true.
Such decision was subject to review only by appeal from an adverse
judgment to P. Green v. Murphy, 259 F. 2d 591 (3d Cir. 1958).
The court in the principal case held that mandamus and prohibition are extraordinary remedies and can only justifiably be employed under rare and exceptional circumstances.
In the federal courts it has been held that generally mandamus
will issue only where there is a clear legal right and where appeal is
clearly inadequate. Bankline v. United States, 163 F.2d 133 (2d Cir.
1947). Mandamus is proper where the lower court is without jurisdiction to take the action for which the complaint is made. Walfenbarger v. Taylor, 169 F.2d 626 (6th Cir. 1948). Similarly it has
been held that the lower court must clearly be without jurisdiction
to warrant issuance of a writ of prohibition by the appellate court.
Petitionof Therianos, 171 F.2d 886 (3d Cir. 1948).
The tendency in West Virginia, it seems, has been to enlarge
the scope of the remedy of mandamus rather than to restrict its use.
Carteo v. City of Bluefield, 132 W. Va. 881, 54 S.E.2d 747 (1949).
Thus, mandamus will not be denied because there is another remedy
unless the other remedy is equally as effective, beneficial and convenient. Stowers v. Blabkburn, 141 W. Va. 328, 90 S.E.2d 277
(1955). However, prohibition may not be as easily obtainable. In
Crawfordv. Taylor, 138 W. Va. 207, 75 S.E.2d 370 (1953), the court
stated in point one of the syllabus, "prohibition lies only to restrain
inferior courts from proceeding in causes over which they have
no jurisdiction, or, in which, having jurisdiction, they are exceeding
their legitimate powers and may not be used as a substitute for writ
of error, appeal or certiorari." See also, Fisher v. Bouchelle, 134 W.
Va. 333, 61 S.E.2d 805 (1950); Rufus v. Easley, 129 W. Va. 410, 40
S.E.2d 827 (1946); Lake O'Woods Club v. Wilhelm, 126 W. Va. 447,
28 S.E.2d 915 (1944).
G. H. A.

